PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BEFORE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
THE LAW APPLIED IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
Although testimonial privileges based upon attorney-client, husbandwife, physician-patient and other confidential relationships, are generally
recognized in the federal courts, 2 their availability in federal adminis1 The privilege against compulsory disclosure accorded certain confidential communications is an exception to the general testimonial duty incumbent upon all persons. See 8 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2197 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Although
the attorney-client and husband-wife privileges were recognized at common law, id.
at §§ 2290, 2333, state legislatures have generally preempted the field. The statutes
are collected id. at §§ 2292 n.2 (attorney-client), 2380 n.5 (physician-patient), 2286
n.21 (journalist-informant), 2286 n.22 (accountant-client), 2286 n.23 (psychologistpatient), 2395 n.1 (priest-penitent). The privilege for communications between husband and wife has often been confused with the privilege accorded testimony as to
anti-marital facts and with the older testimonial disqualification of a spouse. A
by-product of this confusion is that the statutes often comprehend the several distinct policies. See id. at §§ 2227-45 (anti-marital facts), 2332-41 (marital communications) and particularly § 2234 (policies distinguished). The statutes are collected in
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
2 No federal court has denied that the privileges based upon confidential communications are available, but controversy and confusion surrounds the question of
what body of law controls the existence and scope of particular privileges. Professor
Moore maintains that under rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, state
privilege law controls. 5 MooREx, FEDERAL PRACTICE
43,07 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. This view is tempered in his discussion of privilege as it applies
to the discovery rules. "The federal court . . . while respecting state statutes on
privilege, should be free to give their own interpretation to the concept of privilege."
His position is based upon the freedom of a federal court to construe the word
"privileged" as it appears in the rules. 4 MOORE
26.23[9] (2d ed. 1962).
The suggestion that federal courts in both diversity and federal question cases are
constitutionally bound to follow state privilege law under the rule in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 117-24 (1956), and the difficulty of applying a rule which provides only for the admissibility of evidence under
state law, federal statute or prior federal equity rules, FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a), has
provoked endless disagreement among the courts and commentators as to whether
federal or state law must be applied. Cases can be found to support almost any view.

See 2B

BARRON

&

HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 967 (1961) [herein-

after cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF]. See also Pugh, Rule 43(a) and the Communication
Privileged Under State Law: An Analysis of Confusion, 7 VAND. L. REv. 556, 570
(1954). A recent view is that at least in diversity cases, privilege is not a matter of
procedure governed by the federal rules "since it goes to relationships established
and maintained outside the area of litigation, and 'affect[s] people's conduct at the
stage of primary private activity and should therefore be classified as substantive or
quasi-substantive . .. '" and thus controlled by state law under Erie. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1962) (Waterman, J.) (quoting
from HART & WECHSLER, Tnm FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1953)).
See the excellent discussion of the problem in Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d
401, 407-09 (5th Cir. 1960).
The problem of evidentiary privileges as matters of "substance" has achieved such
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trative proceedings is presently the subject of controversy.3 Unfortunately, those courts faced with the problem have provided little enlightenment as to the doctrinal basis upon which such claims are to be
honored or rejected.
proportions that the recent Judicial Conference report on federal evidence rules appears to have studiously avoided the cases and literature. CoMiMrrTr ON RUL.ES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES OF EviDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES Disnucr COURTS 29-40 (1962) (study prepared by the

Reporter for the Special Committee on Evidence). The Special Committee on Evidence which prepared the report tentatively concluded that "rules of evidence, which
would be uniform throughout the Federal court system, are both advisable and
feasible." Id. at ix. One commentator has concluded, however, that: "A prudent committee would avoid privilege in state law cases. Advice which conflicts with the Erie
doctrine as presently understood is more easily ignored by the Court than corrected
by it." Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. REv. 275, S02
(1962).
For a view of Erie and its progeny which would leave questions of privilege to
federal law and federal courts see Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARv. L. REV. 906 (1954)
(answering some provocative questions posed in HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra at
659-60). Professor Kurland maintains that only those rules which in advance of trial,
taken in the abstract, are such as to substantially favor one side or the other in litigation should be controlled by state law. Kurland, supra at 915-16. See also PRELIMINARY
REPORT op. cit. supra at 38.
Claims to privilege based upon confidential communications are uniformly recognized in both state administrative and judicial proceedings. Most state statutes are
phrased in terms which generally prohibit the compulsion of testimony or place a
duty of silence upon a confidant who comes within the terms of the act. See statutes
referred to in note 1 supra. In the absence of a grant of administrative subpoena power
exceeding that of the state courts, it is clear that the privilege would be available.
See Note, Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1214,
1218-19 (1941). Section 10 of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act
provides that "agencies shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law."
NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

STATE LAws,

HANDBOOK AND

PROCEEDINGS 215 (1961). The earlier Model Act and many state statutes contain similar
provisions. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws. ch. 30A, § 11(2) (1962); CODE OF VA. § 9-6.11(a)
(1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(21.5) (1961).
3 Although there is adequate authority recognizing the attorney-client privilege in
IRS proceedings, see cases cited at note 7 infra, the Government unsuccessfully
asserted in a recent case that the privilege was not available. United States v. Summe,
208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962). This claim as well as the uncertainty as to whether
state or "federal" law governs difficult questions as to the scope of privilege prompted
a recent note of concern from the Committee on Bulletin and Tax Notes, Section of
Taxation, American Bar Association. Orkin, Attorney-Client Privilege in Tax Matters,
49 A.B.A.J. 794 (1963). The CAB has posed a similar threat to the attorney-client
privilege by maintaining that it is not available in Board investigations of air carrier
associations and pressing the claim in the face of a district court decision to the
contrary. Compare CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C.
1961), with Air Transp. Ass'n, IA Av. L. REP. 21,355 (CAB Jan. 31, 1963). This latter
controversy and the specter of Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F.
Supp. 771 (N.D. 11. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) (the lower court had held
the attorney-client privilege not available to corporations), petition for cert. filed, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Sept. 5, 1963) (No. 439), prompted a quick reaction in print
from the counsel of record for an intervening airline in Air Transport Association.
See Miller, The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262 (1963).
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A wide variety of federal agencies are empowered by congressional
enactment to subpoena individuals and documents for the purpose of
effecting their statutory responsibilities. 4 Nowhere in these statutes is
mention made of privileged testimony or documents which would be
immune to compulsory process. Instead, the legislation uniformly makes
use of broad phraseology to the effect that all relevant documents or
testimony shall be subject to subpoena. 5 When called upon to enforce
4 E.g., Federal Trade Commission, 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958); Securities
and Exchange Commission, 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1958) (Securities
Act of 1933); 48 Stat. 900 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1958) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934); 49 Stat. 831 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79r(c) (1958) (Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935); 54 Stat. 842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(b) (1958) (Investment Company
Act of 1940); 54 Stat. 85 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9-(b) (Investment Advisors Act of
1940); National Labor Relations Board, 61 Stat. 150 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
161(1) (1958); Federal Communications Commission, 48 Stat. 1096 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 409(e) (1958); Interstate Commerce Commission, 26 Stat. 743 (1891), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 12(1) (1958); Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, 72
Stat. 753 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1354(c) (1958); Civil Aeronautics Board, 72 Stat. 792 (1958),
49 U.S.C. § 1484(b) (1958); Commissioner of Internal Revenue, INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 7602.
For the statutes of other agencies empowered to compel testimony and the production of documents see 1 DAvis, AD sINIsRATrIvE LAW § 3.03 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as DAvis]; 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 30 (1960). See also the list of agencies possessing
subpoena power as of 1941 in UNrrED STATES ATroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTE ON
ADMINISMATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMNIsTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIEs 41435 (1941).
5 See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602: "For the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining
the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . .or collecting any such
liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, paper, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act . . . or
any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries
relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear . . .
and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony,
under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry . .. " (Emphasis added.)
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958): "For the
purposes of [the statutes entrusted to the Commission for enforcement] . . . the
Commission shall have the power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony
of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any
matter under investigation." (Emphasis added.)
The language of the various acts seems wrought in a pattern that may be traced to
the first Interstate Commerce Act: "[F]or the purposes of this act the [Interstate
Commerce] Commission shall have power to require the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and
24 Stat. 383 (1887) (as
documents relating to any matter under investigation .
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 12(1) (1958)).
It should be noted that the federal Administrative Procedure Act makes no reference
to privileged communications. Section 6(c) provides for the issuance of subpoenas
authorized by law and directs that "upon contest the court shall sustain any such
subpoena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is found to be in accord-
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6

agency subpoenas, however, the courts have refused to acknowledge such
sweeping powers and have been disposed to maintain at least the
common-law privileges 7 even in the face of agency claims denying their

availability.8
With the exception of controversies arising out of the administration
of the Internal Revenue Code, the case law is scanty and rarely provides
firm holdings. The Seventh Circuit has held that the FTC need not
ance with law .... " 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1958). If this provision
were seen as defining the scope of available review it might obviate any claim of
privilege not clearly provided for by statute since the legislative history indicates that
it was intended to afford inquiry only into the jurisdictional power of the agency to
issue the subpoena. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG. 2D Sass., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT-LEGISLATIvE HISTORY 27-28, 206, 227, 265, 363, 415 (Comm. Print
1946). No court has made reference to this section in deciding a privilege case, but it
is likely that "in accordance with law" would be construed as permitting a broad
inquiry into the question of privilege. See 1 DAvis § 312, at 216.
Although the first Model State Administrative Procedure Act was not approved until
after the passage of the federal statute, drafts presented to the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as early as 1942 contained the section directing
compliance with the law of privilege. PROCEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 273 (1942).
The legislative history of the federal act does not reveal advertence to this provision.
6 No federal agency has the power to directly enforce its own subpoenas. See ICC
v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); 1 DAvis § 3.11. Statutes granting subpoena power to
the agencies are uniformly accompanied by grants of jurisdiction to the federal district courts to entertain enforcement proceedings either on the motion of the agency
itself or by virtue of an appearance by a United States Attorney. See statutes cited in
1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 30 (1960). Although some acts provide criminal penalties for
failure to comply with a subpoena, they have seldom been used and there is some
indication that a subpoenaee can challenge the legality of a subpoena without subjecting himself to the threat of criminal conviction if he is wrong. See Comment, Procedures to Challenge the Process of Administrative Agencies, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 508
(1963).
The usual procedure is for the Government to file an action which requests that
the district court order compliance with the subpoena. The defendant may answer
setting up a defense but if he is unsuccessful an order will issue, the violation of
which is punishable as contempt. Most circuits have held that such orders are appealable, e.g., O'Conner v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958); Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953). But see Application of Davis,
303 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1962), vacated as moot mem., 374 U.S. 495 (1963).
7 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963) (attorney-client) (IRS); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorneyclient) (IRS); United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962) (attorney-client)
(IRS); CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (attorneyclient); Gilles v. Del Guercio, 150 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (marital) (review of
deportation proceeding); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948) (attorneyclient). See also United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1963) (attorney-client)
(IRS); Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956)
(attorney-client) (IRS); Chapman v. Goodman, 219 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1955) (attorneyclient) (IRS); In re Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1961) (attorey-client) (IRS);
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (attorney-client) (IRS); United
States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955) (attorey-client) (IRS).
8 United States v. Summe, supra note 7, at 926 (attorney-client) (IRS); CAB v. Air
Transp. Ass'n of America, supra note 7 (attorney-client).
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honor a claim of accountant-client privilege.9 A district court has held
that the CAB must honor the attorney-client privilege, 10 and another
district court has held that the SEC is similarly constrained." This
small group of cases stands in contrast to the more developed body of
doctrine fashioned in the enforcement of Internal Revenue subpoenas,
where there is clear authority for the recognition of the attorney-client
privilege' 2 and indications that the physician-patient privilege will prevail when the issue is squarely presented. 13 Claims to an accountant14
client privilege before the IRS have been emphatically rejected.
The major problem presented by the cases is the lack of self-conscious
judicial attention to the question of what law should be applied when
an administrative agency calls upon the courts to enforce a subpoena
against a claim of privilege. The purpose of this comment is to determine whether or not there is a consistent doctrine that may be used
in granting or rejecting such claims.
McMann v. SEC 1 is an appropriate beginning. McMann sued his
stockbrokers and during the course of litigation the SEC instituted an
investigation into transactions in the shares of certain companies which
had been traded by McMann through the brokers. It was suspected
that he had paid supposedly disinterested parties to recommend the
shares to the public, and the Commission subpoenaed the records of the
brokerage account in the hope that they would disclose the illicit transactions. Although the brokers were prepared to comply, McMann asked
the court hearing his original suit for an injunction pendente lite to
restrain production of the documents. The injunction was denied and
9 FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962). The claim was based
upon an Illinois statute and was aimed at preventing the disclosure of material in
the hands of an accountant who received it from a trade association to which St. Regis
had reported. See text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
10 CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (Holtzoff,
J.). See also text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
11 SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948).
12 Cases cited at note 7 supra.
13 See In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954); Gretsky v. Basso, 136 F. Supp. 640 (D. Mass. 1955).
Both courts indicated that the privilege might be available if warranted by the circumstances, but found that the disclosures demanded did not constitute a breach of
privilege. See text accompanying notes 57-59 infra. The court in Gretsky suggested
that the statutory protection from "unnecessary examination," INT. RPV. CODE OF
1954, § 7605(b), might extend "to the taxpayer's interest in protecting its relationships with third parties." 136 F. Supp. at 641.
14 Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); Dorfman v. Rombs, 218
F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963). See also, e.g., Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682, 686 (8th
Cir. 1956); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
15 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
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on appeal it was argued that the transactions were "confidential" and
"privileged."'U
No privilege for broker-client communications was known at common
law and no state had created one by statute. Judge Learned Hand,
writing for the court, adverted to the general duty of all persons to
testify and the specific interests served by granting exceptions to that
duty in the form of privilege. He rejected the broker-client relationship
as a justifiable exception since "very near the end of the hierarchy of
values which might dictate . . . a privilege would be the secrecy of a

man's speculations upon a stock market in an inquiry into the existence
7
of trade practices which a statute has condemned."'
No quarrel may be had with this conclusion. The analysis, however,
neglects a most important factor-the statute creating the agencies'
subpoena power. Since the power to compel testimony is granted by
congressional enactment it would seem that the enabling statute would
have produced at least a starting point in the search for a rule of decision.' 8 The opinion, however, does not ask if the statute authorizing
the SEC to issue such subpoenas either precludes, demands or allows the
recognition of the privilege. Instead it rejects the claim and in so doing
assumes "that the conduct of investigation under these statutes is subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings . .

.,.

The bare holding in McMann is that there is no broker-client privilege before the SEC. It is based in part, however, on the assumption
that SEC proceedings may be subject to the same testimonial privileges
as would obtain before a court. We are not informed as to why this
might be the case or what class of judicial proceedings might serve as
a yardstick. Judge Hand's assumption has influenced subsequent courts
and is partly responsible for the current confusion.
The assumption that investigations conducted by an administrative
agency are subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings served as a linchpin for the decision in Falsone v. United
States.20 Falsone, an accountant, had been summoned by an IRS agent
to appear and testify on matters pertaining to the tax liability of two
of his clients who were then under investigation. He appeared but
refused to testify and the Government obtained a district court order
Id. at 378.
17 Ibid.
1S Although the Supreme Court once indicated that this approach was appropriate,
United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 335-36 (1915), only one reported
case rests on an interpretation of the relevant statute. CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of
America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (attorney-client). But cf. Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1953) (accountant-client) (IRS).
19 87 F.2d at 378.
20 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).
16
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directing compliance with the summons. On appeal it was argued that
the matters under inquiry were cloaked by a testimonial privilege for
communications between accountant and client.
The court opened its discussion of the privilege question by explicitly
indulging in Judge Hand's assumption. 2' It then reasoned that since
the purported privilege was unknown at common law it could rest only
upon a state or federal statute. 22 The claim under a "federal statute"
was based upon the statutory power of the Secretary of the Treasury
to prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents
or attorneys representing claimants before his department. The regulations provided for the qualification of certified public accountants as
agents and Falsone was enrolled as such. He argued that since the
regulations granted an agent the same rights, powers and privileges as
an enrolled attorney, the testimonial privilege extended to communications with an attorney should accrue to an accountant as well. The
court refused to accept this reasoning, holding that even if the regulations could be so interpreted they would conflict with the statute au23
thorizing IRS investigations and the statute would prevail.
The claim under state law was based upon a Florida statute creating
an accountant-client privilege. Falsone argued that since the proceeding to enforce the subpoena was subject to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, state privilege law was applicable under rule 43(a). 24 Granting that the rule might govern questions of privilege and refer to state
law, the court nevertheless distinguished between the judicial proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena, to which the federal rules
applied, and the administrative proceeding itself, to which the rules
25
were clearly inapplicable.
21 The preliminary assumption was "that the conduct of investigations under this
statute is subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings .... "
205 F.2d at 738 (citing McMann). The court took no notice of the fact that the
statutory scheme for the regulation of the securities industry considered in McMann
differed in both purpose and execution from that reflected in the Internal Revenue
Code.
22 "Appellant concedes, as he must, that at common law no privilege was attached
to communications from 'client' to accountant. If such a privilege exists, it can only
arise from some federal or state statute." 205 F.2d at 739.
23 205 F.2d at 741.
24 "All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the
United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is
held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence
governs . . . . The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like
manner." Fm. R. Civ. P. 43(a). It is not at all clear that even under rule 43(a) a state
privilege rule would be applicable. See note 2 supra.
25 205 F.2d at 742. The federal rules apply "to proceedings to compel the giving of
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The logic of the opinion is difficult to accept. If, as the court assumed
by adopting Judge Hand's reasoning, the content of privilege law for
an administrative proceeding is to be found in the practice of judicial
tribunals, the court's subsequent analysis seems irrelevant. The treasury department regulations can hardly be seen to confer rights in judicial proceedings. The court, however, evaluated the treasury regulations
as a source of law defining the powers of the IRS without reference to
the practice of any court. Judge Hand's assumption seems abandoned
sub silentio. Further, if judicial practice is to be adopted, the dictates
of rule 43(a) might well be controlling, not of their own force, but by
virtue of the original assumption. The court, however, dearly pointed
out that administrative proceedings were not to be subject to the same
26
rules as obtained before a court.

The adoption of Judge Hand's assumption, rather than controlling
the reasoning in Falsone, diverted attention from a thorough analysis
of the problem. Without the assumption attention would first have
been focused upon the statute. The court apparently held that the
federal statute precluded the recognition of an accountant-client privilege. If this is true then no claim under state law could even have been
entertained. Under such a view, however, it would be difficult if not
impossible to distinguish the case where a claim of lawyer-dient privilege was raised. The court avoided the potential dilemma by adopting
Judge Hand's assumption and then impliedly placing common-law privi27
lege in a favored position.
The utility of basing an opinion in this field upon the assumption
that judicial practice is applicable becomes dear when one observes a
court that desires to uphold a claim of privilege against a Government
contention that a statute authorizes the compulsion of any relevant testimony. In United States v. Summe 28 the Government sought a court
order to compel full compliance with an IRS summons issued to an
attorney in connection with an investigation of the tax liability of two
testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an
officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the United States except
as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the
court in the proceedings ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3). (Emphasis added.) The
Falsone court's distinction becomes clear when it is observed that the district court
may modify the procedural rules at will. It certainly lacks the power to do the same
to rules establishing the rights of the parties before the court.
26 "[S]peaking generally, the system of rules of evidence in force for trials by
jury or even in courts of equity is not applicable, either by historical precedent, or
by sound practical policy, to inquiries of fact determinable by administrative tribunals
or officers." 205 F.2d at 742.
27 See note 22 supra.
28 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
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of his clients. The attorney refused to divulge information as to matters
which he claimed were cloaked by an attorney-client privilege and the
Government responded by arguing that the privilege was not applicable
to proceedings under the Internal Revenue Code. 29 While the opinion
is confusing it appears to reason as follows: The "character" of the proceedings in question supports to "some extent" the Government's position
that the attorney-client privilege is not applicable; but there "is doubt"
as to the power to compel a lawyer's testimony about his client because
the privilege derives from the common law and would be recognized
if testimony were sought in a federal court; thus, since there is some
authority to the effect that the privilege should be honored by the IRS
and the "most forcible precedent" acknowledges the privilege in SEC
proceedings; there being no case "squarely holding" that there is no
privilege in investigative proceedings; "it is therefore necessary that the
court proceed on the premise that the attorney-client privilege must be
30
recognized at this investigation."
The problem in reading Summe is to discover the end to which the
court marshals its logic. It is certainly not to construe the language of
the statute. The provocative suggestion of the Government that the
statute precludes the privilege is left unexplored. Even where an analogous precedent is relied upon, no consideration is given to the question of whether the inquisitorial powers of the IRS and the SEC display
similarity of purpose and technique; or whether Congress may not have
intended to shape entirely different institutions whose need to pierce
the veil of privilege in order to carry out their mandates is not equally
compelling.
Even where a court has felt constrained to consider the statute, the
easy answer provided by a conclusory presumption has proved irresistible. In CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America3' the agency sought to
compel the production of documents by means of an administrative
subpoena duces tecum. The defendant, a trade association of air carriers, refused to comply, claiming that the material was protected by
an attorney-client privilege. In the district court the agency argued that
the attorney-client privilege could not be invoked before the CAB by
the trade association or its members in an investigation authorized under
the appropriate provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. 32 Without any
consideration of the detailed and comprehensive investigative powers
29

Id. at 925-26.

30 Id. at 926-27. The court went on to define the scope of the privilege in the

circumstances of the particular case, holding only one of six disputed questions to
be improper.
31 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (Holtzoff, J.).
32 72 Stat. 743, 766, 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1377, 1385 (1958).
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granted the Board by the statute, the court held the contrary. The
opinion speaks for itself: "The attorney-client privilege is deeply embedded and is part of the warp and woof of the common law. In order
to abrogate it in whole or in part as to any proceeding whatsoever,
affirmative legislative action would be required that is free from ambiguity."33
It is not claimed that the courts have ignored a simple or obvious
solution. The statutes give no indication that they are amenable to
any particular interpretation as to privileged communications and Congress does not appear to have adverted to the problem when considering
administrative procedure.3 4 On the other hand, assumptions and presumptions should be a last resort and not a favored device. The courts
are at least obliged to exhaust legitimate doctrinal possibilities before
deserting an agency's statutory framework in favor of ad hoc decisions
which largely fail to provide guidance for future counseling or litigation.
There can be no doubt as to the power of Congress to establish or
bar testimonial privileges in agency proceedings. This could be accomplished by a statute directed at the subpoena powers of a particular
agency or in the form of general legislation on the order of the Administrative Procedure Act.3 5 Since Congress has not specifically dealt
with the question,3 6 however, a claim of privilege before an agency can
be viewed as presenting a problem of choice of law. If, for example,
the statutes under which the agency demands enforcement fail to provide an explicit answer it may be argued that under the Rules of Decision Act, 37 state law must govern. The act indicates an appropriate

source of law for cases founded upon all jurisdictional grants.38 It
expresses a general policy of conformity to local law and simultaneously
93 201 F. Supp. at 318.
34 See note 5 supra. But cf. the solution of the problem under the Antitrust Civil
Process Act, 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. 1312 (Supp. IV, 1963), discussed note 82 infra.
3 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1005(c) (1958). But cf. Louisell, supra note 2, at 119-20.
36 The only federal statute governing privileged communications is section 21(a)
of the Bankruptcy Act. It provides that a bankrupt or his spouse may be examined
as to business transacted by the spouse or to which the spouse is a party "any law of
the United States or of any State to the contrary notvithstanding." 32 Stat. 798
(1903), as amended, 52 Stat. 852 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1958).
37 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
38 IA MooRE
0.305[31 (1961); HART 9. WECHSL.R, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 697 (1963); Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Cases, 69
YALE L.J. 1428, 1431 (1960). See also, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co. 317 U.S.
173 (1942) (federal law applied in a diversity case); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City
Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103 (1939) (state law applied in a case removed to federal court
as one arising under the laws of the United States). For discussion of the resolution
of the conflict between state and federal law in cases founded upon two important
jurisdictional grants see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 374-86 (1957); Hill, The Erie
Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1013 (1953).
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affirms the principle of the supremacy dause 9 by asserting the superior
authority of federal law: "The laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
40
apply."
A court is thus obliged to examine a federal statute when it arguably
controls a contested issue.4 1 If the statute is silent there is at least a
prima facie case for the application of state law.
Silence, however, is not always the final answer. The "recognized
futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes" 42 inevitably presents
the federal courts with the problem of deciding issues, arising within
the framework of federal legislation, which are not resolvable with even
the most supple techniques of construction, but which nevertheless may
commend themselves to the application of "federal" law. These "interstices" 43 have often been filled with case-made federal law rather than
with the law of some state.44 The line of demarcation between issues
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
40 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). The statute has been on the books in substantially the
same form since its first enactment in 1789. For the historical background see Warren,
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAav. L. REv. 49
(1923); 1 CROSSKEY, PoLIriCS AND THE CONSTITUTION 627 (1953); 2 id. at 865-66, 912-37.
41 When, as in the case of the enforcement of administrative subpoenas, jurisdiction
is conferred by the same statutes which create the agency's subpoena power, the duty
to examine the relevant legislation becomes self-evident. See statutes cited I BARRON
& HOLTZOFF § 30 (1960).
42 Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447, 470 (1942).
43 "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motion." Mr.
Justice Holmes dissenting in Southern Pac. R.R. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
44 See generally IA MOORE
0.319-0.324. Authoritative justification for invoking
the powers of "interstitial" legislation to supply a federal rule where the statute cannot
be construed to provide an answer is rarely forthcoming. Professor Mishkin puts it
that there "must" be competence in the federal courts to declare a "federal" rule
when a problem "bear[s] substantial relation to an established federal operation."
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rxv. 797, 799 (1957).
As to the Rules of Decision Act he concedes that the general problem "could be
viewed as a matter of the interpretation of that act" in that "it could be said that
there is a substantial penumbra surrounding each program of congressional legislation where indeed 'the Constitution . . . or Act of Congress otherwise require' that
state law be automatically applied." Id. at 800-01 n.16. But since the "terms of the
act are 'almost perversely uninformative,' " and furthermore "judicial authority has
often said that the act 'is merely declarative of the rule which would exist in the
absence of the statute' . . . [it] is significant principally as an expression of an underlying policy ....
" Ibid. But cf. Comment, supra note 38, at 1432-34. While it may
be true that the supremacy clause sketches the farthest reach of any statute asserting
the authority of federal law, it is equally true that Congress could limit its effect by
3D
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deserving of one alternative or the other is difficult to discern. "Federal"
law has been invoked for a confusing array of reasons which may seem
persuasive in individual cases but which ultimately fail to frame a
45
coherent doctrine.
It has been said that in an instance not particularly treated by a statute, congressional legislation may have established a particular policy
which provides a federal rule sufficient to prevent the adoption of state
law under the Rules of Decision Act.4 6 Some cases have gone beyond
this to suggest that the policy of a legislative program may be such as
to demand the wholesale, a priori, rejection of state law in favor of
federal rules of decision in all those instances where the federal statute
does not provide a specific answer.4" Although there has been cogent
criticism of the lack of precision with which the courts have justified
the development of "federal" rules in such instances,48 the cases can
be understood as at least establishing that when a federal program may
be hampered in its administration and effect, the courts feel justified in
interpreting the Rules of Decision Act in a manner that avoids the
49
application of state law.

setting a more stringent standard for the displacement of state law than that which
the courts have adopted. It could demand that state law be followed except where
"Acts of Congress specifically otherwise require or provide." Even if discretion "must"
exist, Congress in its wisdom could deny it to the federal judiciary. Thus it would
seem that focus upon even "perversely uninformative" language might serve as a
useful reference point or even as a check upon the degree of discretion with which
Congress has endowed the courts. Note, 53 COLUmN. L. Rav. 991, 1002-08 (1953).
45 "The line between situations where reference must be made to state law and
those where federal decisional law will control is not dear. Specific situations have
been faced and decided; to categorize or generalize from specific rulings is not easy.
The courts may talk in terms of the intent of Congress, the relationship with state
agencies, whether the right is 'purely a creature of congressional enactment,' whether
following state law would frustrate a federal policy, whether a right, duty or status
is created by a state. Certain areas are so 'dominated by the sweep of federal statutes
that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law
.
'" A.. MooRE
0.323[22], at 3757-58. (Citations omitted.)
46 See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); Fahs v.
Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1955).
47 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); cf. United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943). Although the opinion in Lincoln Mills marshalled the "intent" of Congress to support the assertion of federal law, it failed to make a convincing argument
in that regard. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, 353 U.S. at 460.
48 Comment, supra note 38, at 1428-29, 1442, 1452.
49 It has been suggested that the Supreme Court indicated that the presence of
the Government as a party to litigation is decisive in establishing a basis for the
rejection of state law and the applicability of a "federal" rule. Id. at 1428, 1439, 1442.
See also, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); cf. Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956). It seems wholly arbitrary that the sole fact of Government participation in an
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Thus, if a federal court fails to find satisfactory answers to the problem of privilege in the enabling statutes of a particular agency, it should
either apply state law or articulate some basis upon which it may be
replaced by federal decisional law. The cases indicate that state law has
not been considered competent authority. Only one circuit has explicitly applied state law to uphold a claim of common-law privilege5O and
action should be viewed as either a sufficient or necessary condition for the displacement of state law. The cases can be read for the alternative proposition that the
effect on the particular Government program at issue is a more reasonable guideline
for determining whether federal or state law should be applied. "The application of
state law . .. [to Government issued commercial paper] would subject the rights and
duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity
in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states." Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra, at 367. See also Bank of
America v. Parnell, supra, at 33-34; United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra, at
309-10; ef. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682
(1963). "There is no reason to believe that .. . Congress discarded for an entire
industry an element essential to a reliable system of settling disputes under existing
contracts or that it contemplated awards by adjustment boards the enforceability of
which depended entirely on the desires of the parties or upon state statutes or court
decisions." Id. at 695. (Emphasis added.) Professor Mishkin has suggested what might
be read as a more open-ended test. He proposes that as to problems bearing substantial relation to an established federal operation "state law cannot govern of its own
force; there must be competence in the federal judiciary to declare the governing
law." Mishkin, supra note 44, at 799. An alternative formulation offered in a footnote
seems to deprive the assertion of any value as test for the displacement of state law.
The power to declare the governing law "must extend to any issue as to which a
tenable (i.e., non-frivolous) claim can be made that the decision could have impact
on the operation of congressional legislation." Id. at 800 n.15. This does not even
seem to go so far as to delimit a prima facie case for the invocation of "federal" law
under the "otherwise require or provide" clause of the Rules of Decision Act. It says
only that the federal court has the power to decide between state and federal law
-that is, the power to construe the "otherwise require or provide" clause as meaning more than "specifically otherwise require or provide." As to whether state or
federal decisional law should govern in any particular instance, Professor Mishkin
indicates that he would not only consider the value to be obtained from asserting
federal law to protect the effectiveness of a federal program, but that such gain must
be balanced against "the potential losses from non-integration of the national program with normal state activities." Id. at 312; ef. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570, 580-82 (1956).
50 Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). "While the authority under which
the proceedings below were instituted stems from congressional enactment, that does
not mean that there exists a federal common law defining the nature and extent of
the privilege between attorney and client." Id. at 627. The court relied in part on its
view that the enforcement proceeding was a "civil case" governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and that rule 43(a) indicated a reference to state law to
determine questions of privilege. Id. at 628. The court in Falsone properly rejected
a similar proposition on the grounds that the federal rules were inapposite to the
determination of the substantive issues raised by the enforcement proceeding. See
text accompanying notes 24-25 supra. Accord, Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633,
636 (2d Cir. 1962); FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 926 (E.D. Ky. 1962). The difficulty presented by the opinion in Baird can be seen in the court's own summation of its
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novel ' state privileges have been uniformly denied recognition. 52 Further, the cases are replete with statements to the effect that "federal
law" governs the question" and that federal investigations "may not
be prevented by matters depending upon state law." 54 Since the relevant
legislation has only occasionally been adverted to, and nowhere analyzed,
it is dear that the statutory language is not the source of the applicable
"federal law." 55
A tentative conclusion is justified. The courts have not found statutory materials explicitly indicating rules of decision for privilege cases.
They have, however, rejected the authority of state law assumedly because federal policies reflected in the statutory programs of the agencies
outweigh those supporting the recognition of state privileges. 56
grounds for decision: "[W]e find (1) that because the relationship of client and attorney
is created and controlled by the law of the various states; and that such creation and
control is recognized, followed, and approved by the federal courts, the nature and
extent of the privilege created between a lawyer and his client by the attorney-client
relationship requires the federal courts to follow the state law; (2) that some considerable number of federal cases enunciate the rule that the state law governs the
rule of privilege; (3) that some federal cases apply the law of the forum state, but do
so without enunciating the principle under which they act; (4) that no federal statute
forbids the use of the law of the forum state, and that if there is any definite rule set
up by federal statute it requires us to follow the law of the forum state, and (5) any
federal 'common law' which may exist does not require us to ignore the forum state
law; (6) that general policy considerations applicable to the law of privilege between
attorney and client support the rule of privilege in this case; (7) that each case must
stand on its own facts, with the courts balancing the public policy considerations
involved, and we hold the law of the forum state should and does control-here the
State of California." Id. at 632. Although points 2, 3, 4, and 5 may be read as a use of
rule 43(a), the policy arguments and the discretion implicit in the remaining conclusions cannot take on importance unless the rule is not applicable and the court is
free to declare the law of privilege for the purposes of an administrative investigation.
51 "Novel" is used to indicate a privilege unknown at common law rather than one
rarely recognized or of recent date. See note 1 supra.
52 FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962) (accountant-client)
(IRS); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953) (accountant-client) (IRS);
cf. In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953) (physicianpatient) (IRS); Gretsky v. Basso, 136 F. Supp. 640 (D. Mass. 1955) (physician-patient)
(IRS).
58 E.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Albert Lindley
Lee Memorial Hosp., supra note 52, at 123; United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925,
927 (E.D. Ky. 1962); Gretsky v. Basso, supra note 52, at 641; cf. FTC v. St. Regis Paper
Co., supra note 52, at 734; Falsone v. United States, supra note 52, at 741-42.
54 Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953).
55 Examination of the statutes supports this conclusion in that the use of general
langnage in conferring investigatory powers makes it impossible to glean any specific
policy as to privileged communications. See statutes cited at notes 4-5 supra.
56 The point might be made with greater clarity if one asserted that the courts
were avoiding the application of state law under the Rules of Decision Act by an expansive interpretation of the "otherwise require or provide" clause. See text accompanying notes 37-49 supra. See also Comment, supra note 38, at 1428, 1433, 1434,
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This conclusion is buttressed by evidence in several cases that where
novel privileges are rejected, their underlying policies are weighed
against the competing claims of the agency. In In re Albert Lindley Lee
Memorial Hosp.57 the IRS had subpoenaed the hospital's records during
the course of an inquiry into the tax liability of an affiliated doctor.
When the hospital refused to comply, the Government sought an enforcement order and the physician intervened. It was claimed that the
records were protected by a state physician-patient privilege but the
district court, applying state law, held that the records were not privileged.SS The Second Circuit affirmed but specifically rejected the applicability of state law. After asserting that "federal law" governed and
indulging in Judge Hand's familiar assumption, the court proceeded to
analyze the circumstances of the subpoena. It concluded that since only
the fact of hospital treatment and not its nature was to be disclosed,
"the public interest in the collection of taxes owing by a taxpayer outweighs the private interest of the patient to avoid embarrassment resulting from being required to give the revenue agent information as to
fees paid the attending physician." 59
Again in FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co.60 the court denied the applicability of state law and went on to evaluate the claim of privilege as an
original question. St. Regis attempted to protect information which
had been turned over to a trade association of which it was a member.
The association in turn gave the material to its Chicago accountants.
Responding to the assertion of an Illinois statute 6' the court observed
that:
We are not persuaded that the relationships between several
members of a trade association and the association accountant
should be considered a relationship equally valued, for the same
reason, as the personal relationship between husband and wife,
priest and penitent, physician and patient, when to do so would
result in a frustration of the Federal Government's performance
of a necessary investigatory function. 62
1437-42. Ironically, the only reference to the act or its policies is in an opinion which
ultimately found state law to be applicable. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 627 (9th
Cir. 1960) (attorney-client) (IRS).
57 209
58 Id.

F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953).
at 122-23.
59 Id. at 124.
60 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962).
61 "Accountant as witness. A public accountant shall not be required by any court
to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential
capacity as a public accountant." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 51 (1961).
62 304 F.2d at 734.
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It is dear that at least where the courts have refused to recognize a
novel privilege claimed under state law they do so as a matter of "federal" law and because of the importance placed upon the investigative

63
function of the agency.

These cases provide only preliminary evidence as to the possible
nature of a coherent doctrine. Despite the rejection of state law and
indications of an independent evaluation of privilege, they may indicate nothing more than discrete judgments refusing effect to state law
64
where the effective prosecution of a federal policy may be hampered.
While such decisions might be characterized as interstitial judicial legislation, they would be of limited significance. It is difficult to quarrel
with an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act that allows a federal court to extend the policy of a statute to the point where it is at
least protected from frustration by local legislation.65
The cases involving the attorney-dient privilege indicate, however,
that the courts have gone beyond the mere protection of federal programs from frustration. All federal courts which have considered the
matter have held that the privilege was available before administrative
agencies, 6 6 although some have found it inapplicable in the circumstances of the case.67 The opinions have been almost unanimously indifferent to state law.6 8 Thus, if state law is not considered relevant, it
must be assumed that the prosecution of a federal program demands a
result that is contrary to the policy of local conformity explicit in the
Rules of Decision Act. This much might be consistent with the rejection of a privilege claimed under state law. Where, however, the courts
purport to recognize an attorney-client privilege-its substance to be
Cf. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953).
The independent policy analysis does, however, indicate that these courts might
be willing to recognize certain privileges as a matter of federal law. It should be
recognized that this involves an analysis which has not been made explicit by any
court: That the "otherwise require or provide" clause of the Rules of Decision Act
permits a rejection of state law because the policy of the federal program concerned
indicates that the privilege should be recognized. The difficulties with this position
are discussed in connection with the attorney-client cases. See text accompanying
notes 65-71 infra.
65 Cf. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944) (shareholders of holding company
liable for assessment on shares of national bank in company portfolio). "It is of
course true that Delaware created this corporation. But the question of liability for
these assessments is a federal question. The policy underlying a federal statute may
not be defeated by such an assertion of state power." Id. at 365.
66 See cases cited at note 7 supra.
67 E.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962); Sale v. United States,
228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956); In re Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1961);
Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass. 1958).
68 The exception is Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). See note 50 supra.
63

64
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delineated by reference to some nonauthoritative body of law69-they
have progressed beyond a simple recognition of the supremacy of federal
interests.
While it is justifiable to invoke a doctrine of interstitial legislation to
prevent frustration of agency investigations, the recognition of a "federal" privilege cannot be so justified. When federal case-made law is
applied in preference to state law its legitimacy must rest upon a judgment that the federal program demands a rule tailored to its requirements. In the case of privileged communications before federal agencies
it is difficult to see how the recognition or creation of a privilege can
be characterized as a doctrine in aid of the agencies' program. The
privilege can only prevent an agency from obtaining information to
which it is arguably entitled under its enabling legislation. In an enforcement proceeding a court merely acts to vindicate the statutory
power of the agency. To limit such power where the rule cannot be
seen as within the scope of the statute is an unwarranted assertion of
0
judicial power.
69 The doctrine drawn upon to deal with claims of attorney-client privilege has
been developed entirely from undifferentiated federal and state cases and the
authoritative text of Dean Wigmore's treatise. See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633, 636-40 (2d Cir. 1962) (Wigmore and federal civil and criminal cases); United
States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 927-28 (E.D. Ky. 1962) (Wigimore and federal civil
and criminal cases); In re Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564, 566-67 (D.D.C. 1961) (federal
civil and criminal cases, a Missouri case, a Minnesota case and Wigmore); Gretsky v.
Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass. 1958) (federal civil and criminal cases, a Massachusetts case and Wigmore). The opinions fail to indicate how either the sources or substance of their doctrine provide rules inherently more protective of federal interests
than those which would result from the application of state law.
70 The recognition of a "federal" privilege implies two assertions of policy: (1)
That the relationship between lawyer and client is deserving of consideration and
support to the extent of depriving an agency of information that may be of importance to the administration of a federal program; and (2) That the effective administration of a federal program demands that a uniform privilege doctrine obtain. The
second assertion appears to be the only one worthy of analysis since if the attorneyclient relationship is valued it may be honored in the form of deference to state
privilege.
While the need for uniformity in the administration of federal programs is often
offered as a justification for the displacement of state law it is rarely subjected to
careful analysis. "Thus, not infrequently the call for 'uniformity' seems basically to
represent a desire for symmetry of abstract legal principles and a revolt against the
complexities of a federated system of government." Mishkin, supra note 44, at 813.
One is hard put to find weighty reasons that demand "uniformity" in privilege doctrine as it applies to federal administrative agencies. The "vagaries of state law" may
be guarded against by an outright rejection of any claim based upon state doctrine that
is judged to be seriously disruptive of a federal legislative program. Indeed, the IRS
and FTC have been amply protected from claims to accountant-client privilege based
upon state law. FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962); Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953). While it might be claimed that all individuals subject to fedeal power should have equal rights and duties vis-A-vis the
Government, it is equally true that there may be reliance upon the existence of local
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While this analysis indicates that the cases recognizing the attorneyclient privilege as a matter of federal law are unwarranted, there is an
alternative explanation that could support their results and perhaps
provide a doctrinal framework for the resolution of claims of privilege
before the agencies.
The cases recognizing the attorney-client privilege but refusing to
uphold a particular claim could be viewed as defining the outer limits
of state privilege doctrine as applied to the agencies. Privilege would
reach only to the point where these cases have drawn the line. Beyond,
to cloak information behind a privilege would frustrate a federal program to a degree which may not be tolerated. The original claim would,
however, have to be based upon state law and in the absence of compelling federal considerations that law would be authoritative and con71
trolling under the Rules of Decision Act.
privileges, see Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1269-70 (1962), and that the Rules of
Decision Act appears to indicate that local law should be apposite in the absence of
a compelling federal interest. Finally, the administrative burden upon the agencies of
adopting investigative policies tailored to local rules is de minimis and could hardly
be seen to justify discarding the judgment of Congress that local conformity should
prevail where the Constitution or statutes "do not otherwise require or provide."
71 See notes 37-49 supra and accompanying text. The application of state law under
the Rules of Decision Act would raise one problem that has not been referred to in
the opinions: If state law is to be applied, which state's law is controlling and is that
question to be decided by the conflicts-of-law rules of the forum state or is the
federal court free to declare its own conflicts rule? The Supreme Court has held that
in diversity cases the conflicts law of the forum must be applied to determine the law
governing issues that rest upon out-of-state circumstances. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). On several occasions the Court has reserved the question
of whether Klaxon applies when jurisdiction is not based upon diversity of citizenship.
See McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 371 n.2 (1945); D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1942). Several commentators have made suggestions
to the effect that whether Klaxon applies should depend upon the nature of the
reference to state law. If it is such that the federal court is enforcing a state-created
cause of action and there is no distinctive federal interest involved Klaxon would be
appropriate. On the other hand, state elements in federal causes of action should
leave the federal courts free to declare their own conflicts rules. Note, 68 HARv. L.
REv. 1212, 1228-29 (1955). Professor Moore would examine the federal policies in the
matter before the court and determine if they "refer to or incorporate" state law and
0.325, at
if so, state law, including conflicts rules, must be applied. IA MOORE
3769-70. This appears to mean that if state law applies, state conflicts law applies and
provides an answer to the question if not a reasoned argument.
Either federal or state conflicts doctrine will present more than the usual difficulty
in arriving at a rule for privileged communications. In particular, the issue of a
conflicts rule to be applied in federal administrative agency cases will be troublesome.
The general rule is that the law of the forum determines the admissibility of evidence,
RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 597 (1934), but privilege doctrine does not go to
the management of the trial in the interests of accurate factual determinations. It is
supposedly based upon an extrinsic policy of fostering and protecting the communicative value of particular relationships. 8 WIGMORE, EvImcz § 2285 (McNaughton rev.
1961). "The public policy under this theory is effective at the point where the communication takes place and not during the litigation." Weinstein, Recognition in the
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The courts do not seem disposed to follow such an approach. Indeed
their insistence upon "federal" law, the eclectic choice of materials used
to fashion doctrine, 72 and the widespread use of Judge Hand's "assumption" seems to indicate a resistance to discrete decisions affirming or rejecting state privileges. Perhaps the explanation lies in the unique
nature of the attorney-client privilege. 3 Despite current criticism of
evidentiary privileges,7 4 the attorney-client protection is still highly valUnited States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56 COLUza. L. REV. 535, 536
(1956).
Although the interstate nature of the businesses that are the peculiar subject of
federal administrative regulation may create difficulties in establishing the "place of
the communication" and may invite forum shopping, the federal courts would retain
the ultimate power to reject any claim that clearly frustrated an investigative program. An alternate rule would very likely be without rational foundation since both
the place of the administrative inquiry as well as the forum in which the enforcement
proceeding takes place are subject to arbitrary location.
72 See note 69 supra.
73 Despite the brevity with which Judge Holtzoff disposed of the problem in Air
Transp., see text accompanying note 33 supra, he offered a provocative idea which
might account for the unique status of a "federal" lawyer-client privilege: "The very
existence of the right of counsel necessitates the attorney-client privilege in order that
a client and his attorney may communicate between themselves freely and confidentially." 201 F. Supp. at 318. Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, establishes the right of any person compelled to appear before an agency to be represented
by counsel. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958). It could be persuasively
argued that this legislative command to the administrative agencies carries with it a
parallel requirement that testimonial privilege be accorded communications between
a subpoenaee and his present and former counsel. The statute could be interpreted
as a federal adoption of the policy of the privilege. Further, since criminal prosecution may result from circumstances under investigation by an agency, the denial of
privilege for communications with counsel who will represent one before the agency
may be an effective denial of the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The agency could subpoena the attorney and elicit incriminating information which
would then be spread upon the public record. But see Application of House, 144
F. Supp. 95, 99-102 (N.D. Cal. 1956); cf. People v. Minkowitz, 220 N.Y. 399, 115 N.E.
987 (1917).
74 See MCCORAcK, EvIDENCE § 81 (1954). "The manifest destiny of evidence law is
a progressive lowering of the barriers to truth. Seeing this tendency, the commentators
who take a wide view, whether from the bench, the bar, or the schools, seem generally
to advocate a narrowing of the field of privilege ....
One may hazard a guess ...
that in a secular sense privileges are on the way out." Id. at 165-66. See also VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 583-84 (1949) (Report of the
Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association); cf. Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (attorney-client
privilege denied to corporations), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), petition for cert.
filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Sept. 5, 1963) (No. 439). Professors Kurland and
Morgan on the brief for appellees argued persuasively, albeit unsuccessfully, that "it
has never been demonstrated, however often asserted, that the benefits to be derived
from the hobbling of the judicial process by the doctrine of privileged attorney-client
communications exist, no less that they are superior to the benefits of full disclosure
that is the principle upon which the entire judicial process depends." Brief for
Appellee, p. 18, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F.2d 314 (7th
Cir. 1963).
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ued, particularly by the bar from whose ranks the bench is almost universally recruited. 75
To adopt a case by case approach evaluating state privileges in the
light of a federal program would inevitably confront the courts with the
problem of establishing a policy basis for distinguishing between the
virtues of an attorney-client privilege and those, for example, of an accountant-client privilege. Given a claim under the latter, the scope of
which was no greater, or perhaps less, than that usually afforded the
former, one would be hard pressed to find a requirement of federal
policy that would justify refusing to honor the novel privilege. The
76
cases, however, have dearly rejected state accountant-client privileges
and even the physician-patient privilege has been denied explicit recognition 77 where that of the attorney-client has been recognized in obiter
78
dicta.
Little can be said for the existing state of the case law. The refusal
to recognize a privilege as applicable to a federal agency may be justified as necessary to the effective prosecution of a federal program, but
the assumption that judicial privileges obtain and the explicit recognition of a "federal" attorney-client privilege are not warranted by any doctrine explicitly or implicitly adopted by the courts.7 9
75 In response to a questionnaire circulated by the Yale Law Journal 107 of 132
attorneys replied that they did not believe that the attorney-client privilege "significantly disrupts the administration of justice" but 38 of 125 were of the opinion that
the rule resulted in evidence being kept out that was not available through some other
source. 101 of 125 felt that the privilege should not be further hemmed in by
limitations. Comment, supra note 70, at 1271. Of 47 judges surveyed 43 felt the
privileged communications rule to be "an obstructive one," but 42 stated that it was
not "significantly disruptive" of the administration of justice. All who expressed an
opinion (40) did not think that the privilege should be subject to further limitations.
Id. at 1272. The symbolic importance of the privilege for the legal profession is
mirrored in Judge Holtzoff's inapposite invocation of the common law in Air Transport. See text accompanying note 33 supra. To see the ancient doctrine of strict construction for statutes in derogation of the common law invoked in a civil case before
a federal court in 1962 is to witness a spontaneous professional reaction. It seems almost unthinkable that the sovereign prerogative of privilege could be abrogated by
a governmental parvenu-the administrative agency.
76 FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962); Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D.
I1. 1963).
77 In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953); Gretsky
v. Basso, 136 F. Supp. 640 (D. Mass. 1955).
78 Cases cited note 67 supra.
79 Significantly, there has been no attempt to examine an agency program in order
to determine the nature of its need for information and the implications of the
particular proceeding for which a subpoena is authorized. While adjudicative hearings
might, without detailed analysis, be analogized to judicial proceedings, a self-informing investigation or rule-making hearing may present different problems that deserve
particular attention. Compare 1 DAvis § 820, with id. at § 314, and id. at § 6.12.
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While the efforts of the judiciary to deal with problems in this field
may be subject to criticism there is little doubt that ultimate responsibility for the confusion and lack of dearly articulated standards must
rest with the agencies themselves or with Congress. All of the agencies
concerned have the statutory power to make rules that are not inconsistent with their enabling legislations 0 Rules declaring that certain
privileges will or will not be available are probably within such powers.81
No agency, however, has exercised the rule-making power in this regard
While the statutes themselves do not offer clear guidelines one would expect that a
court exercising the power of "interstitial legislation" would feel constrained to examine the interests at stake and provide a reasoned opinion reflective of its determination.
80 E.g., "The [SEC] ... shall have authority from time to time to make, issue,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as it may deem
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to
carry out the provisions of this title ....
" 53 Stat. 1173 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77sss(a)
(1958). See also 48 Stat. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1958) (SEC); 72
Stat. 643 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1958) (CAB); 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 US.C. § 46(g)
(1958) (FTC); INT. Rrv. CODE of 1954, § 7805(a).
81 A rule declaring a privilege would be the voluntary act of the agency depriving
itself of information in certain cases whether or not it possessed the power of compulsion. The only class of persons who might have standing to object to such a rule
would be litigants before an agency who were deprived of the opportunity to identify
and enter into the record information that could be cloaked behind the privilege.
Section 6(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires that "agency subpoenas
authorized by law shall be issued to any party upon request and, as may be required
by rules of procedure, upon a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable
scope of the evidence soughL" 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1958). It might
be argued that this establishes the right of a party to an appropriate subpoena if it
is within the statutory power of the agency. Thus the validity of a rule which
arguably restricted the issuance of a subpoena authorized by law would be open to
question. The legislative history of the act, however, indicates that it was thought to
do no more than confer upon private parties "the same access to subpoenas as that
available to the representatives of agencies." SENATE CoMMs. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 79TH
CONG. 2d SESS., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar-LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 206, 265 (Comm.
Print 1946) (Senate and House committee reports).
If, however, a rule were promulgated which denied the availability of a privilege, it
would clearly be open to challenge in a judicial proceeding to enforce a subpoena.
It would be claimed that the rule was invalid and that the privilege obtained. The
focus of attention would be upon the scope of the agency's rule-making power.
Rather than inquire into whether a statutory policy against the privilege could be
ascertained the court would evaluate the agency's assertion that it had the power to
create such a policy by rule. The CAB, for example, is empowered "to make and
amend such general or special rules, regulations, and procedure, pursuant to and
consistent with the provisions of this Act, as it shall deem necessary to carry out the
provisions of, and to exercise and perform its powers and duties under, this Act,"
72 Stat. 743 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1958). This section would be read in conjunction with the blanket power to compel testimony and inspect premises and records
granted to the Board as to air carriers and those having control over, or affiliated
with an air carrier. See 72 Stat. 766, 770, 792, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1377(a), (e), 1385, 1484(b).
Only a finding that the rule denying a privilege was inconsistent with the grant of
investigative power would support a judgment that it was beyond the rule-making
power granted by Congress and thus of no effect. Cf. 1 DAvis § 5.03.
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and the problem has not yet reached political proportions on a scale
that can stimulate congressional action.8 2 Since no legislative solution
is in sight it is the responsibility of the federal bench to give more than
lip service to the complex problems of federalism raised by competing
claims of federal and state interests. Privilege policies have been adopted
to meet the needs of specialized relationships as measured by state legislatures. These policies may be relied upon by the public and they should
not be abrogated in the absence of a showing that the successful prosecution of a federal program requires access to a type of information
which would be protected under state law. The existence of subpoena
power does not on its face "require or provide" that state privilege law
is an inadequate ground for resistance to administrative inquiry.
82 A recent and notable exception to the usual rule of congressional inadvertence
to privilege problems is the Antitrust Civil Process Act. The Attorney General is given
the power to demand the production of any document relevant to a civil antitrust
investigation with the exception, inter alia, that no demand may "require the production of any documentary evidence which would be privileged from disclosure if
demanded by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid
of a grand jury investigation of such alleged antitrust violation." 76 Stat. 548, 549
(1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1963). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "the admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
The power to declare rules of privilege has been exercised by the courts in the course
of compelling compliance with the requirements of subpoenas issued on behalf of a
grand jury. See, e.g., Schwimmer v. United States, 282 F.2d 855, 863-66 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 852 U.S. 88 (1956) (attorney-client); Petition of Borden Co., 75 F. Supp.
857, 858-59 (N.D. I1. 1948) (refusal to follow state accountant-client privilege).

